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I want to combine two hitherto largely independent research projects, scientific un-
derstanding and mechanistic explanations. Understanding is not only achieved by
answering why-questions, that is, by providing scientific explanations, but also by
answering what-questions, that is, by providing what I call scientific descriptions.
Based on this distinction, I develop three forms of understanding: understanding-what,
understanding-why, and understanding-how. I argue that understanding-how is a par-
ticularly deep form of understanding, because it is based on mechanistic explanations,
which answer why something happens in virtue of what it is made of. I apply the three
forms of understanding to two case studies: first, to the historical development of ther-
modynamics and, second, to the differences between the Clausius and the Boltzmann
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Why do bodies fall to the ground? Why do gases expand in a box? Why do black holes bend
light? These are all important scientific questions that demand a scientific explanation—indeed,
scientific explanations are defined to be answers to why-questions. This definition goes back to the
deductive-nomological model (Hempel and Oppenheim, 1948), in which a scientific explanation
is a logical relationship between the explanans, which consists of universal laws and statements
concerning particular facts, and the explanandum, which is the event to be explained.
Similar approaches to the meaning of a scientific explanation can be found in competing theories.
When van Fraassen (1980, Ch. 5.4) describes his pragmatic theory of explanation, he is explicit
about the aim of a scientific explanation, “An explanation is an answer to a why-question. So, a the-
ory of explanation must be a theory of why-questions.” Here, an adequate answer to a why-question
gives context dependent relevant information about the explanandum. A similar restriction of the
scope of scientific explanations can be found in Woodward’s interventionist account of explana-
tion: “Instead, I focus on a much narrower range of explanatory activities—roughly, those that
consist of providing causal explanations ([. . . ]) of why some particular outcome or general pattern
of outcomes occurs” (Woodward, 2003, p. 4).
But there is another class of questions that has been mostly overlooked in the literature on sci-
entific explanations. These are what-questions as in the following: What is gravity? What is a
gas? What is a black hole? What is light? I think these kinds of questions have generally been
overlooked because the last common ancestor of all modern theories of scientific explanations,
the deductive–nomological model, was situated in the logical empiricist tradition, where what-
questions were regarded as rather dubious or metaphysical. Although Hempel explicitly distin-
guished what-questions from why-questions, he only pursued the why in his theory of explanation:
“In times past questions as to the what and the why of the empirical world were often answered by
myths [. . . ]” (Hempel, 1962, p. 9).
A notable exception to this tradition are mechanistic explanations (Machamer et al., 2000; Bech-
tel and Abrahamsen, 2005; Glennan, 2017; Glennan and Illari, 2018), where an explanation ex-
plains in terms of a mechanism. Before answering why a phenomenon happens, a mechanistic
explanation presupposes an answer to what a system or an object is composed of. I call answers to
what-questions, which are the prerequisite for scientific explanations in general, and mechanistic
explanations in particular, scientific descriptions. Scientific descriptions need to be distinguished
from what-questions of a more philosophical kind that are the main topic of metaphysics, episte-
mology, and ethics (What is a substance? What is knowledge? What is justice?). I don’t aim at
a criterion for demarcating these two types of descriptions; instead, I want to argue that scientific
descriptions play an important and probably crucial, although underrated, role for understanding
science, and in particular physics, as why-questions do.1
1In The Open Society and Its Enemies, Popper (1945/2020, p. 30) criticizes methodological essentialism and defends
methodological nominalism, in which what-questions are not important: “The methodological nominalist will never
think that a question like ‘What is energy?’ or ‘What is movement?’ or ‘What is an atom?’ is an important question
for physics; but he will attach importance to a question like: ‘How can the energy of the sun be made useful?’ or
‘How does a planet move?’ or ’Under what condition does an atom radiate light?’ And to those philosophers who
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There are two main camps in elucidating what the nature of understanding is. For one side,
understanding is a mental act of “grasping” the object of understanding. In order to know what
understanding is, one has to analyze what the act of grasping is by itself and what are the objects
one aims at grasping. For Zagzebski (2001), understanding results from grasping relations among
our beliefs in such a way that our mind has conscious transparency about how these beliefs are
related. The problem with this account is that we may have conscious transparency of why a certain
situation occurred and, therefore, we may understand this situation, and still we can be wrong about
the states of affairs in the world. In Zagzebski’s theory, we can have complete understanding and
still fail to match the facts. That is why Kvanvig (2003) adds that understanding must comprise
truth (similarly Strevens, 2013).
In all these accounts, what is fundamental about understanding is this internal or psychological
mental act of grasping. Against this internalist theory of understanding, there has arisen an ob-
jectivist theory of understanding, which has shifted the focus more on analyzing understanding in
terms of knowledge and explanation. In this spirit, Trout (2002) attacked the internalist theory:
scientists throughout history have been deceived by their internal (subjective) feelings of having
understood something, because they can be wrong about the explanation without realizing that
they are wrong. So a sense of transparency by itself is neither necessary nor sufficient for under-
standing. Genuine understanding, on the other hand, hinges on correct (or approximately correct)
explanations.
I will focus on the theory of scientific inquiry and the aims of understanding by Grimm (2008,
2016) and the contextual theory of understanding by de Regt (2017) as candidates for objectivist
theories, and argue that both approaches still leave out what-questions. Their theories, therefore,
not only lack one crucial aspect of scientific understanding, but also allow physical theories that do
not have the sufficient resources for scientific descriptions to provide genuine understanding—this
impacts other scientific virtues as well. Grimm and de Regt, in general, try to trace how scientists
gain understanding in their actual practice, while I aim at discovering norms or criteria for under-
standing. I am, in particular, interested in exploring why, in certain circumstances, mechanistic
explanations provide a deeper sense of understanding. I will be presenting several physical exam-
ples that show how mechanisms provide deeper understanding; in particular, I investigate in detail
the influence of mechanisms on the historical development of thermodynamics and on the meaning
of entropy.
Recently, Illari (2019) combined the contextual theory of understanding with mechanistic expla-
nations, hitherto rather independent fields of research, yielding a theory of mechanistic understand-
ing in terms of intelligible mechanistic explanations. While she primarily singles out the usability
of mechanistic explanations for building models and simulations as the main criteria for mecha-
nistic understanding, I focus on the epistemic merit of mechanistic explanations and argue why
understanding in the sense of Grimm and de Regt is, in some cases, not understanding enough.
tell him that before having answered the ‘what is’ question he cannot hope to give exact answers to any of the ‘how’
questions, he will reply, if at all, by pointing out that he much prefers that modest degree of exactness which he can
achieve by his methods to the pretentious muddle which they have achieved by theirs.” Obviously, I don’t agree with
Popper, but he also uses what-questions and how-questions in a more general way than I do.
2
2 Scientific Inquiry as Asking ‘Why?’ and ‘What?’
The first step of my argument is to discuss why we begin with scientific endeavor in the first
place and what we aim at when doing science. The epistemic goal we want to reach is scientific
understanding (for a defense of this view, see also, Potochnik 2015, 2017, whereas Elliott and
McKaughan 2014 show how non-epistemic values influence the practice of science, too), and I
argue that one crucial part to reach this goal is to answer what-questions. Whether this is correct
depends on what one demands from a theory of understanding. As I show, Grimm’s theory of
scientific inquiry leaves out this aspect, while answers to what-questions played an important role
already for Aristotle and also for Wesley Salmon.
2.1 The Origin and Epistemic Goals of Scientific Inquiry
Why do certain phenomena need an explanation? And when is a phenomenon satisfactorily ex-
plained? Naively, one would think that a certain phenomenon needs an explanation when we are
puzzled or surprised about this phenomenon, and the phenomenon is satisfactorily explained when
we cease to be puzzled. As Grimm (2008, section 2) rightly points out, this account of scientific
inquiry is insufficient. First, it is circular, because “a situation would be in need of explanation
on this view (hence puzzling) in virtue of its puzzlingness” (p. 484–5). Second, there are many
phenomena that require an explanation although these phenomena are not (or no longer) puzzling
or surprising. Being puzzled or surprised is too much a subjective feeling as to justify all demands
for explanation.
Grimm (2008), therefore, suggests another account, which is inspired by the following quote:
I am tempted to say that explanation locates something in actuality, showing its actual
connections with other things, while understanding locates it in a network of possi-
bility, showing the connections it would have to other nonactual things or processes.
(Nozick, 1981, p. 12)
The first part describes what an explanation is: a phenomenon is explained when one relates the
phenomenon to other things that have really happened. The second part is crucial for Grimm’s
theory of explanatory inquiry and understanding because “the need for explanation arises for us
in the first place only because we view the world in terms of this network of possibility” (Grimm,
2008, p. 486). So the reason why we want to explain, for example, the daily rising of the sun is
not primarily that we are surprised by this (maybe we are indeed), but because we imagine that it
could be different—that it does not rise or that it moves in a different way.
Two things need to be noted. First, we seek an explanation if we imagine different ways a certain
factual situation could have been. But not all counterfactual situations are interesting (Grimm,
2008, section 4); we are not curious about why the sun does not turn into a giant chocolate-glazed
donut, for instance. The set of possibilities that are relevant for us is constrained by observations
and our background knowledge about the phenomenon. Grimm terms these convictions proto-
understanding. So only the counterfactuals in our proto-understanding of the situation drive us to
seek an explanation. Second, it is not enough that an explanation shows that something occurred;
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the explanation has to be rich enough that it also makes clear why the factual situation occurred and
not the counterfactual. Newtonian mechanics, for instance, can make claims about counterfactuals
because it postulates laws of nature.
There are, however, situations that demand an explanation, although we may not imagine any
counterfactuals at all. Furthermore, even if we had the laws of nature and could use them, we may
not completely understand the phenomenon. Grimm is aware of this in a later paper:
that even though one might possess formulae that describe how the various elements
of a system relate to one another, and even though one might be able to manipulate the
formulae in order to predict and control how the system will unfold, the system might
nonetheless seem like a black box, and thus in an important sense unintelligible. In
particular, it is often said that unless one can visualize the system, perhaps by means
of a model, the system will remain unintelligible. (Grimm, 2016, p. 219)
It is correct that when one uses laws in an operational way, one does not understand the behavior of
the system in an important sense: at least, the system is not visualizable. But the issue runs deeper
than just being not visualizable. Those theories that introduce the objects as black boxes do not
answer what a physical object is made of. This may be posed independently of any behavior. It
is an independent source of scientific inquiry to ask for the inner structure of an object. This type
of question is mostly bracketed out in the literature on scientific explanation—probably due to the
aftermath of logical positivism.
An early exception within this tradition, however, is Wesley Salmon, who emphasized both
aspects of scientific inquiry:
We want to know how things work and, it should be added, what they are made of.
This may be characterized as causal-mechanical understanding [. . . ]. It is the kind of
understanding we achieve when we take apart an old-fashioned watch, with springs
and cogged wheels, and successfully put it back together again, seeing how each part
functions in relation to all the others. Before we execute this process, the watch is like
a ‘black box’ whose internal workings are mysterious. What we want to do is open up
the black box and see how it works. (Salmon, 1998, p. 87)
Here, Salmon explicitly distinguishes why-questions from what-questions, and he says that an-
swers to both kinds of questions give us a particular high form of understanding, in his account
a causal-mechanical understanding. It seems that what something is made of is for Salmon only
an intermediary project in order to be used in a scientific explanation to answer why an event oc-
curred. But what-question can be independently posed from a why-question and has a value to
be answered by itself, although I agree with Salmon that the insights from such an answer can
be used in a scientific explanation. In order to distinguish scientific explanations from answers to
what-questions, I will call the latter scientific descriptions (see Fig. 1).2
2I can envision a rough taxonomy for scientific descriptions into material, structural, and functional descriptions, but







Figure 1: Relation between understanding, explanation, and description. Understanding can be
gained in two different ways, by asking a what-question or a why-questions. Answers to
what-questions are scientific descriptions, and answers to why-questions lead to a scien-
tific explanations. Whereas scientific explanations occur in two different forms, namely,
causal or non-causal, there is not yet a further fine-grained taxonomy of scientific descrip-
tions. The dashed arrow indicates that a scientific description may be used (in different
degrees) in scientific explanations.
A certain class of causal explanations along the lines envisioned by Salmon are mechanistic
explanations, which have been thoroughly investigated by philosophers in the last two decades
initiated by Glennan (1996) and Machamer et al. (2000). I give a more thorough overview and
detailed discussion of mechanistic explanation in the next section. For now it suffices to know that
mechanistic explanations start with answering what a physical system (or, in general, a mechanism)
is composed of. The parts of the physical system that are identified are used to explain why a certain
phenomenon exemplified by the physical system occurs. Mechanistic explanations answer two
questions about a phenomenon instead of one and explain how a phenomenon occurs in virtue of the
behavior of its constituent parts. Therefore, mechanistic explanations are particularly epistemically
precious. They provide a deeper understanding than an explanation that merely focuses on the
‘Why?’. I, therefore, distinguish three kinds of understanding:
1. Understanding-what: The form of understanding of a thing or an object provided by a sci-
entific description.
2. Understanding-why: The form of understanding of a phenomenon provided by a scientific
explanation.
3. Understanding-how: The form of understanding of a phenomenon provided by a scientific
explanation that explains in virtue of the behavior of the parts identified by a scientific de-
scription.
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It is possible to gain a certain form of understanding, namely, understanding-what, even with-
out a scientific explanation. A scientific description gives information about the constitution of a
physical object or a physical system, and, therefore, provides some form of understanding of this
object or system. Similarly, one can have a certain form of understanding, namely, understanding-
why, without having a scientific description or with an incomplete or partial scientific description.
Understanding-how, on the other hand, combines (aspects of) understanding-what and understand-
ing-why by explaining why something comes about in terms of its constituents. Since more ques-
tions about a phenomenon are answered, understanding-how is a deeper form of understanding
than the other two. I don’t think it’s reasonable to make a hierarchy between understanding-what
and understanding-why, because these are different kinds of questions aiming at different aspects
of a phenomenon.
Recently, Illari (2019) analyzed how mechanistic explanations provide understanding, too, but
her approach is more pragmatic:
A phenomenon is mechanistically understood when scientists have an intelligible me-
chanistic explanation for the phenomenon; i.e. a mechanistic explanation that they can
use. (Illari, 2019, p. 69)
In contrast to my account, which focuses on how much we can learn or answer about the world,
Illari identifies mechanical explanations as useful for building models and simulations without
evaluating whether mechanical explanations yield a better or deeper kind of understanding. Nev-
ertheless, she mentions that “[u]nderstanding comes in greater and lesser degrees” (p. 82), but a
hierarchy of understanding still needs to be worked out (a promising path is shown in Kelp, 2015).
I agree with Illari that mechanistic explanations are useful in practice, but that is not the reason, for
me, that they yield understanding—it is rather a pragmatic fallout. In this sense, I side more with
Salmon’s approach: there is something intrinsic about mechanistic explanations that they provide
understanding, namely, by means of a scientific description.
2.2 Scientific Descriptions and Aristotle’s Four Causes
I now want to compare this scheme of understanding with Aristotle’s famous theory of the four
“causes”,3 one of the first systematic treatments of this topic,4 because Grimm (2008) begins his
paper with Aristotle’s idea for the origin of scientific inquiry and because, I think, Aristotle’s theory
of the four causes is still insightful for current debates, especially for presenting different kinds of
scientific descriptions.
Aristotle’s primary question about scientific inquiry is similar to Grimm’s: “For the point of our
investigation is to acquire knowledge, and a prerequisite for knowing anything is understanding why
3The Greek word that Aristotle uses is αιτια (aitia), which is standardly translated as cause. Since Vlastos (1969)
distinguishes between Aristotle’s causes and becauses, there is a debate whether to translate αιτια rather as expla-
nation (see also Annas, 1982, section III for a defense of explanation). We will see in the following that explanation
would be more suitable in my scheme.
4Probably the first extant discussion of understanding and explanation is Plato’s Phaedo, which Aristotle explicitly
criticizes (Annas, 1982).
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it is as it is—in other words, grasping its primary cause” (Physics, II.3, 194b16–b22, translated in
Aristotle, 2008, p. 38–9). Right after this sentence, Aristotle lists the four causes, material, formal,
efficient, and final, without justifying where they come from or why they are complete (Stein, 2011,
p. 701). This lacuna by Aristotle has been filled by Hennig (2009), whose account is relevant for
my interpretation:5
My aim is to say what Aristotle said, not in the sense of reporting what he said, but
rather in the sense of repeating and elaborating what he said. I will show that his
fourfold distinction naturally arises from the combination of two distinctions that apply
to all natural beings. First, concerning any natural change, we may distinguish between
the thing that changes and the change that it undergoes. Neither of these could be
studied without in any sense referring to the other. Second, we may ask out of what
a natural thing comes to be what it is, and we may ask an analogous question about a
natural change. Conversely, we may ask what a thing or a change naturally comes to
be. Again, the two questions, out of what something comes to be what it is, and what
it comes to be, cannot be separated. (Hennig, 2009, pp. 137–8)
In Hennig’s interpretation, Aristotle focuses his account on natural change, which is defined to be
a typical or regular change or pattern in nature (Hennig, 2009, section I). And this natural change
has two components: first, a thing that changes, and second change itself (see Fig. 2). For example,
the rolling of a billiard ball on a slope consists of the billiard ball, the thing undergoing the change,
and the motion of the billiard ball. Next, we can ask two questions of the thing and change: (i)
‘Out of what does a thing or change come to be what it is?’ and (ii) ‘What does a thing or change
come to be?’
Hennig argues that (i) is answered by the material cause for a thing and the efficient cause
for change, whereas (ii) is answered by the formal cause for a thing and the final cause for change
(Fig. 2). A comprehensive justification for these answers demands some familiarity with Aristotle’s
metaphysics, especially the role of actuality and potentiality, whose thorough examination would
go beyond the scope of this paper, so I briefly illustrate Hennig’s scheme by examples. The material
cause of a billiard ball is what it consists of, that is, its matter.6 The formal cause of a billiard ball,
that what comes to be, is the billiard ball—it remains to be a billiard ball. But, if the material cause
of the billiard ball were to be radioactive matter, the formal cause, that into which the billiard ball
typically changes after some time, would be a new atomic composition plus radiation. The efficient
cause and the final cause do not, according to Hennig, characterize a thing but change itself. The
efficient cause of change is not only the cause that initiates the change but that keeps the change
to continue (Hennig, 2009, section IV). The efficient cause of the motion of a billiard ball on the
table, hence, is not only the strike of a cue, but also the inertia of the ball (if the ball keeps moving).
5As Hennig mentions in section VI by citing Avicenna and Aquinas, there have been many attempts to unify the four
causes in the history of philosophy.
6Hennig (2009, section II) emphasizes that Aristotle has something more general in mind than what something consists
of, namely, that which potentially is the result; therefore, there are other examples where the material cause is not
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Figure 2: Hennig’s scheme of the four causes of Aristotle. Natural change is decomposed into the
thing undergoing the change and change itself. Of the thing and change, two identical
pairs of questions can be asked: ‘What it comes from?’ and ‘What it comes to be?’. By
answering these questions for the thing and for change, it turns out that what the material
cause is for the thing is the efficient cause for change, and what the formal cause is for
the thing is the final cause for change.
The final cause of change is in Hennig’s interpretation the end or the direction of change. As in the
case of the efficient cause, the final cause is not only to be construed as a final stage or result, but it
can also come or come into being in a certain chain of steps; it is “primarily the ‘limit’ or standard
pattern to which [change] proceeds” (Hennig, 2009, pp. 152–3). The final cause of a falling billiard
ball, accordingly, would be to hit the ground, or the final cause of a radioactive decay would be to
result in radiation.
I don’t intend to criticize Henning’s account of Aristotle’s four causes, although it seems a bit un-
satisfactory or confusing that the material and formal cause of a thing also refer to change, although
change is separated from the thing, but this may be rather due to Aristotle’s idiosyncratic view of
potentiality; instead, I want to give a complementary, epistemic interpretation of the four causes in
terms of explanations and descriptions—in doing so I depart from the historical Aristotle and focus
only on physics, unlike Aristotle, who aimed at a scheme for change in general, including, biology
and human action. Hennig presents an ontological view of the four causes by referring to the things
and the changes and processes in the world by starting to dissect what natural change is, and that
may be the reason why he settles for cause as the translation of aitia instead of explanation.7
7Cartwright et al. (2020) distinguish two questions, which show the difference between my and Hennig’s approach:
1. An epistemological question: “What kind of explanation is involved?”
2. An ontological question: “What is going on in the world?”
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If we take, however, the view of, for example, Vlastos (1969), Annas (1982), and Stein (2011)
that aitia means explanation (or something similar to explanation), we can start our investigation
with our requirements for understanding. Let us look again at Aristotle’s quote on how to gain
knowledge or understanding: “For the point of our investigation is to acquire knowledge, and a
prerequisite for knowing anything is understanding why it is as it is—in other words, grasping
its primary cause” (Physics, II.3, 194b16–b22, translated in Aristotle, 2008, p. 38–9). The basic
question (and it seems the only basic question to acquire knowledge) is to ask ‘Why?’ which is
answered by an explanation. I think, however, that Aristotle’s formulation of “why it is as it is”
incorporates two questions: 8 there is a why-question about change or phenomena, but there is also
a what-question about things or physical objects. And in contrast to Hennig, these questions arise
from epistemic requirements about the nature of understanding, which, in my view, incorporates
these two aspects. There are two ways to answer the what-question in Aristotle’s scheme, and
two ways to answer the why-question (see Fig. 3). Therefore, the question ‘What is the billiard
ball made of?” can be answered by two kinds of descriptions: the actual matter of the billiard
ball (material cause) or the structure of the matter parts (formal cause) (to be close to Hennig’s
scheme, the formal description of the billiard ball can also be a description of the potential form
of the billiard ball). ‘Why does the billiard ball move the way it does?’ is answered by a scientific






Figure 3: An alternative interpretation of Aristotle’s four causes.
We, thus, see that my approach from understanding leads to the same pairing of causes, that is,
material/formal and efficient/final, as Hennig’s scheme. Material and formal causes or descriptions
are answers to what-questions about things or physical objects, while efficient and final causes or
explanations are answers to why-questions about change or physical phenomena.
8I don’t claim that this is what Aristotle indeed had in mind, but rather that this is a plausible way to interpret the
passage.
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Greco (2014) also proposes an update to Aristotle’s four causes. He proposes, which I agree on,
that it is more suitable to translate the Greek episteme as understanding, instead of the traditional
knowledge. Aristotle, according to Greco, proposed a scheme for how to gain understanding,
namely, by giving an explanation or an account. Citing one of the four causes counts as such
an account. In Greco’s neo-Aristotelian update, the four causes exemplify four different kinds of
dependence relations:
[W]hat do Aristotle’s four causes have in common? One way to think of it is that they
each cite some kind of ‘dependence relation.’ (Greco, 2014, p. 290)
Introducing dependence relations make it particularly straightforward to generalize Aristotle’s
scheme to modern dependence relations: (i) efficient causal relations, (ii) constitutive (‘material’)
relations, (iii) essential (‘formal’) relations, and (iv) teleological relations. Greco adds further
relations, like (v) mereological relations, (vi) logical or mathematical relations, (vii) conceptual
relations, and (viii) supervenience relations. For Greco, however, all these dependence relations
are on a par, because they are used to answer why-questions. But causal relations are of a different
kind than mereological relations relations, for example. Causal relations explain why some event
comes about due to its relation in a causal network, whereas mereological relations describe what
something is made of by citing how parts are related to wholes.
3 Scientific Descriptions and Mechanisms
I have argued that we not only gain understanding by explaining why something happened as it
happened and not otherwise, we may gain understanding from the description of the inner structure
of an object just for the sake of understanding what it is. Often the inner structure helps us to
understand the behavior of the entire object in a mechanistic way. And there are many what-
questions in physics that are important by themselves: What is space? What is time? What is
motion? What is a black hole? Different what-questions lead to different scientific descriptions. It
would be an important project to find a simple modern taxonomy of scientific descriptions as has
been found for scientific explanations. An overarching theory has been developed by philosophers
to answer “Why?” in terms of “What?”: mechanistic explanations.
This combination of what and why is often subsumed in asking ‘How?’, as a mechanistic expla-
nation explains by means of how the constituents of a system generate the phenomenon (Glennan,
2017). More precisely, a mechanism is minimally defined in the following way:
A mechanism for a phenomenon consists of entities (or parts) whose activities and
interactions are organized so as to be responsible for the phenomenon. (Glennan,
2017, p. 17)9
This definition illustrates in which way an answer to ‘How?’ is decomposed into an answer to
‘What?’ and ‘Why?’.
9There are two other definitions of mechanisms often discussed, one presented by Machamer et al. (2000) and the other
by Bechtel and Abrahamsen (2005), which are rather tailored to the biological sciences than to physics.
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First, it is said that one needs to give a description of the parts of a mechanism, that is, the
constituents that give rise to a phenomenon. It is assumed that these parts are discrete (Kuhlmann
and Glennan, 2014, p. 339) and that they have a location in space (Glennan, 2017, p. 34). From
the examples of mechanism, I take it, the space is the three-dimensional space that we perceive,
although I can envision to generalize to more complicated spaces in order to have mechanisms for
modern physics, like string theory or quantum gravity. There are two ways to understand what it
means for the parts of a mechanism to be discrete. Either one adheres to a form of atomism, where
the parts behave like discrete atoms, or, more generally, the parts can be identified in bounded
regions of space, like the parts of the electromagnetic field. Glennan (2017, p. 34) seems to imply
the latter more general reading, “Entities can have locations [. . . ] even if they are widely spread
out and overlap other entities. There is no particular limit on how far an entity can be sprawled
across spacetime.”
Given a mechanism, a further question is to find out whether it is fundamental or compound, that
is, made out of further mechanisms (Glennan, 2017, Section 7.5). Machamer et al. (2000, Ch. 5.1)
say that when using a theory one postulates certain fundamental building blocks in the domain of
the theory, whose existence and properties are taken as given. These are the fundamental parts of a
mechanism.
Second, the why-part of mechanisms, the way it explains a phenomenon, says that the parts of
the mechanism interact in an organized way. In other words, the parts of a mechanism stand in
causal relations to one another, which are themselves mediated by mechanisms. Glennan (2017, p.
145) describes the general idea in this way, “If one event causes a second, there exists a mechanism
by which the first event contributes to the production of the second. If some kind of event causes
another kind of event, it is because there are one or more kinds of mechanisms by which events of
one kind cause events of the second.” The details of this rough descriptions need to be spelled out.
Even if a particular theory of causation is not advocated, it is assumed that the causal relations in a
mechanistic explanation are to be local (Illari and Williamson, 2011). Locality, in this case, means
that the mechanism is closely located to the phenomenon, or, in other words, that the mechanism
bringing about the phenomenon is in the approximate spatiotemporal region as the phenomenon
itself. This locality requirement, as well as the former requirement of spatiotemporal localization,
seems to be challenged by quantum mechanics.
4 A Critique of Current Theories of Understanding
We will see in this section that current theories of understanding are not so much concerned about
what-questions and ontology, either, but rather trace how physicists, and scientists in general, gain
understanding without making normative claims about how physics can be and maybe ought to
be done. This does not only miss a crucial aspect of scientific inquiry but also sends a message
to physicists that their current practice of only saving the phenomena is good enough, which I
oppose. I will reject Grimm’s theory that understanding physics is understanding-by-grasping-
structures, as well as the de Regt–Dieks theory. Both these theories cannot account for the deeper
level of understanding that a theory with a mechanism offers.
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4.1 Grimm’s Account
Grimm (2016) distinguishes different kinds of understanding in the natural sciences. There is
understanding-as-grasping-of-structure, which is a pragmatic way to understand nature. It suf-
fices that the theory offers a recipe or algorithm that specifies how manipulating one part changes
the behavior of another. Grimm grants, however, that there is a deeper way of understanding,
namely, understanding-as-picturability. This kind of understanding supplements understanding-
as-grasping-structure by making the physical processes in some (unspecified) way visualizable.
But as I said in section 2.1, visualizability is not the real issue a scientific explanation aims at.
If visualizable theories want to tell us something profound about nature beyond a heuristic or
mnemonic story (and beyond empirical behavior), they need to introduce a mechanism. Other-
wise, one may run into a paradoxical situation as in Feynman diagrams. These diagrams make
certain quantum processes visualizable, but they are not intended to represent actual microscopic
processes in nature (at least not in the standard interpretation of these diagrams, see Kaiser, 2005).
If understanding were only to be understanding-as-picturability, Feynman diagrams would give us
sufficient understanding of phenomena involving particle creation and annihilation. Therefore, un-
derstanding is not only about grasping the structure of the world in an operational way or about
making the theory visualizable.
Grimm (2016, p. 220) says that understanding-as-grasping-structure is “understanding enough”
in physics.10 His argument is that over time, physicists got more familiar and more comfortable
with just grasping structure, that is, with using theories for mere manipulations and predictions,
that this kind of understanding turned out to be the kind of understanding science really needs to
aim at. For instance, although Newton and his peers felt uneasy with action-at-a-distance, future
generations got used to Newton’s theory of gravitation and accepted it as a full-fledged physical
theory. Newton did not feign any hypothesis about the underlying mechanism of gravitation, be-
cause he was not able to find one, although he kept trying. His successors, on the other hand, did
not think the quest for a mechanism a task worthwhile for physics at all. That is historically correct
(at least for gravity11), because physicists were more convinced by positivism after Newton and,
of course, by the huge experimental success of Newtonian mechanics in accounting for novel phe-
nomena, like the motion of comets, such that a search for an ontological underpinning of gravity
seemed to be unnecessary.
Ironically, progress in gravity was finally made by Einstein, for whom grasping structure was
not understanding enough (Howard, 2005). It is often said that in the early development of spe-
cial relativity, grasping structure was enough for Einstein, because he seemed to be at this time
more sympathetic to positivism. But upon further scrutiny this is incorrect (Norton, 2016a). Even
in his 1905 paper On the Electrodynamics of Moving Bodies, Einstein presents a thought exper-
10Grimm does so in order to argue that, like in physics, understanding-as-grasping-structure is understanding enough
for understanding people.
11The situation for electromagnetism looked a bit different: especially in Britain, physicists early on presupposed
a mechanism for the electromagentic field, of which Maxwell’s vortex model was a prominent example (Siegel,
1991, 2014), while in Germany Wilhelm Weber’s action-at-a-distance theory was popular until it was challenged by
Helmholtz and Hertz at the end of the 19th century (Steinle, 2013; Buchwald, 2013).
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iment, which illustrates that from different reference systems one gets different electromagnetic
explanations for the same physical effects (Einstein, 1905). Although the logical positivists praised
Einstein’s axiomatic approach to special relativity, the 1905 paper already shows that Einstein was
not only concerned about saving the phenomena but also about certain theoretical virtues of a phys-
ical theory, something that became more and more important to him (Giovanelli, 2013). Einstein
starts the paper by pointing to a unsatisfactory asymmetry of Maxwell’s theory of electrodynam-
ics in explaining the current in a piece of metal—it seems that no one before Einstein was deeply
concerned about this asymmetry. If a piece of metal is moved through a magnetic field of a resting
magnet, a current is induced in the metal by the magnetic field, and if the metal is at rest and the
magnet is moving the same current is induced this time, however, by an electric field, although the
metal and the magnet have the same relative velocity.
One may think that Einstein’s attitude was positivistic and that understanding-as-grasping-struc-
ture was enough for him, because he seemed to argue that the same empirical behavior (that is, the
same relative velocity) shall be explained in the same way; in particular, the different explanations
ought not to differ in the behavior of unobservable objects (here, the electric or magnetic field).
This example, rather, shows that Einstein was driven, even if he may not be aware of, by trying to
understand why nature would have this kind of asymmetry and whether it is possible to explain
the same empirical observation without such asymmetry between the electric and magnetic field.
A positivist would rather shrug her shoulders and re-interpret the asymmetry and the electric and
magnetic field as mere theoretical artifacts of electromagnetism—only the empirical predictions
would matter. Einstein, on the other hand, was bothered by this asymmetry because he was not
content with the ways relative velocity is explained. He was bothered by the asymmetry and tried
to overcome this problem because he was not a positivist and because understanding-as-grasping-
structure was not enough for him.
Later, Einstein took up the same basic idea from his 1905 paper, which lead to his general theory
of relativity: although there seems to be a theoretical difference between inertial and gravitational
mass, it is impossible to ”observationally distinguish between a state of uniform acceleration and
the presence of a gravitational field." (Smeenk and Martin, 2007, p. 624). Einstein used this equiva-
lence principle to build up a more unified theory of gravity in which the entire physics in free falling
systems is equivalent to the physics in unaccelerated systems (Norton, 1993; Hoefer, 1994).12
Another example Grimm puts forward to support his claim about understanding enough is quan-
tum mechanics, when Wolfgang Pauli said in notoriously demeaning manner:
Even though the demand of these children for Anschaulichkeit [visualizability] is
partly a legitimate and a healthy one, still this demand should never count in physics
as an argument for the retention of fixed conceptual systems. Once the new conceptual
systems are settled, then also these will be anschaulich [visualizable]. (from de Regt,
2014, p. 385)
12Max Abraham and Gustav Mie pursued a different strategy to build a unified theory of gravity by implementing
gravity directly into special relativity (Norton, 2007; Smeenk and Martin, 2007). This project was finally abandoned
for theoretical and empirical reasons. I thank Dennis Lehmkuhl for this example.
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Pauli makes it easy and just redefines what “anschaulich” can mean over time. That physicists
get used to certain practices only tells us something about the psychology of physicists and their
appreciation for the history of their discipline. It is a sociological fact that physicists have gotten
more familiar and content with understanding-as-grasping-structure; it does not mean that physics
has to be so or that it was always so. It is a historically interesting observation that for the de-
velopment of quantum mechanics grasping structure was regarded as enough, while for relativity
theory, which was developed around the same time, grasping structure was not enough. This was
one of the main points (apart from the issue of non-locality), where Einstein disagreed with Bohr
and especially with Heisenberg (Fine, 1993; Beller, 1999; Becker, 2018; van Strien, 2020):
Naturally one cannot do justice to [the argument] by means of a wave function. Thus
I incline to the opinion that the wave function does not (completely) describe what is
real, but only a to us empirically accessible maximal knowledge regarding that which
really exists [. . .] This is what I mean when I advance the view that quantum mechan-
ics gives an incomplete description of the real state of affairs. (Einstein in a letter to
Paul Epstein on November 10, 1945, quoted in Harrigan and Spekkens, 2010, p, 151)
Einstein is famous for interpreting the wave-function as representing the statistical patterns of an
ensemble of identically prepared systems. He granted that for practical purposes the wave-function
gives in this way the correct empirical predictions, but quantum mechanics would still lack to
explain certain facts about the world. Therefore, quantum mechanics would not give us enough
understanding about the goings-on in the world according to Einstein. So, for certain practical
purposes understanding structure is understanding enough, but physics in general ought not to end
there.
4.2 De Regt’s Contextual Theory of Understanding
This pragmatic attitude within philosophy of science can also be observed in the de-Regt–Dieks
contextual account of understanding (de Regt and Dieks, 2005; de Regt, 2017). This theory is
based on two doctrines, the Criterion for Understanding Phenomena (CUP) and the Criterion for
the Intelligibility of Theories (CIT1):
- CUP: A phenomenon P is understood scientifically if and only if there is an explanation
of P that is based on an intelligible theory T and conforms to the basic epistemic values of
empirical adequacy and internal consistency. (de Regt, 2017, p. 92)
- CIT1: A scientific theory T (in one or more of its representations) is intelligible for scientists
(in context C) if they can recognize qualitatively characteristic consequences of T without
performing exact calculations. (de Regt, 2017, p. 102)
Understanding is here defined with respect to a scientific theory, which itself has to fulfill certain
standards: the theory has to be empirically adequate, internally consistent, and intelligible. Intel-
ligibility is here not defined in terms of visualizability but in a pragmatic way: a theory is said to
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be intelligible if a scientist can easily apply the theory for practical matters (de Regt, 2017, p. 40
and p. 101), of which CIT1 is an instantiation particularly suited for physics. Because this kind
of intelligibility of a theory does not only depend on the theory itself but also on the abilities and
knowledge of the scientist, and maybe on the current state of technology for applying the theory,
intelligibility is a non-intrinsic, contextual property of a theory—hence the name of this theory of
understanding. Intelligibility is also relative to a particular scientist; so a theory that is intelligible
to one scientist may be unintelligible to another.
The main problem I see with de Regt’s account, as with Grimm’s, is that it grants too many the-
ories to provide for genuine understanding. In particular, textbook quantum mechanics would give
a physicist understanding of the corresponding phenomena. In order to justify the intelligibility
criterion, de Regt (2017, pp. 101–2) compares a physical theory with an oracle that happen to give
the same correct predictions as the physical theory. The oracle is inferior to the physical theory
because it does not give us understanding of how the phenomena are generated; it is rather like a
black box that spits out the correct answers. It is obvious that an oracle would not be a satisfying
device for scientists:
Scientists want more than this: in addition they want insight, and therefore they need
to open the black box and consider the workings of the theory that generates the pre-
dictions. Whatever this theory looks like, it should not be merely another black box
producing the empirically adequate descriptions and predictions (on pain of infinite
regress). In contrast to an oracle, a scientific theory should be intelligible: the theory
itself should be understood. The opacity of an oracle entails that the way in which its
predictions are generated is unclear. The intelligibility of scientific theory, by contrast,
implies that it should be possible to grasp how its predictions are generated. A sign
that such a grasp has been achieved is the fact that one has developed a “feeling” for
the consequences of the theory in concrete situations [. . . ]. (de Regt, 2017, pp. 101–2)
But textbook quantum mechanics treats the physical systems under considerations as black boxes,
although they are intelligible according to de Regt’s criterion! Quantum mechanics is a candidate
for a fundamental theory and ought not to leave these issues open. The recipe of quantum me-
chanics is therefore similar to an oracle, an oracle that gives us a glimpse, though, of the inner
goings-on but is secretive about the deeper detailed story (see, for instance, Maudlin, 2019, for
this kind of critique of quantum mechanics). Really opening the black box of quantum phenomena
would require a scientific description of the constituents of these systems and how the behavior
of these constituents generates the observable phenomena. A highly-skilled physicists having per-
fect “feeling” for the consequences of quantum mechanics would still fail to understand quantum
phenomena in the deeper sense.
Yet, one may argue that textbook quantum mechanics in fact differs from an oracle, because
quantum mechanics makes predictions by applying certain steps and conceptual tools.13 In con-
trast, an oracle just delivers an answer without showing how this answer has been generated. I agree
that quantum mechanics does better than an oracle in justifying predictions, but it is still mysterious
13Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for raising this concern.
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and unexplained what quantum systems are made of, what the wave-function is, what non-locality
is, and what measurement devices are (see also Norsen, 2017, who identifies three problems of
textbook quantum mechanics: the ontology problem, the locality problem, and the measurement
problem). All these problems ultimately arise because quantum mechanics does not sufficiently
answer what a quantum system is made of. This is one major motivation for alternative theories,
like the de Broglie–Bohm theory, the GRW collapse theory (which has been even developed with
two kinds of scientific descriptions of quantum objects), and Everett’s many-worlds theory.
de Regt and Gijsbers (2017) have made the contextual theory even more pragmatic and turned
it into a theory of effectiveness. They no longer define understanding relative to a theory but rel-
ative to a representational device, which can be “theories, models, and diagrams” (p. 50). The
representational device need not be internally consistent, but only intelligible (in the above sense
of easily usable) and reliably successful. A theory can be reliably successful in three different
ways: by making correct predictions (formerly dubbed empirical adequacy), by guiding practical
applications, and by developing better science (p. 56). Finally, a representational device is said to
be effective if it is intelligible and reliably successful. Hence, the effectiveness account of under-
standing goes like this:
According to our effectiveness condition on understanding, understanding can only
be gained from representational devices that are, for a subject S in a context C, effective
in the sense defined above. (de Regt and Gijsbers, 2017, p. 55)
As in the contextual theory, the effectiveness theory approves too many theories to provide (gen-
uine) understanding—it’s not my concern in this paper to evaluate representational devices other
than theories. Are there other options for philosophers to analyze understanding in physics? In par-
ticular, are philosophers in a position to criticize the practice of physicists (and scientists in general)
and to set norms for what counts as genuine understanding? Although I assume that many would
see that as a very unpalatable claim for philosophers to make, philosophers have, to my mind, the
proper training and the appropriate tools to do so. First, philosophers have a certain distance and
impartiality to physical theories because they are normally not invested in a particular physical
theory or a particular physical research project. Second, philosophers of science are trained in
evaluating the methodology of science (and physics). Third, philosophers of science are trained in
comparing historical case studies, from which certain lessons about the practice of science can be
drawn. This, in conjunction with expertise in ontology, epistemology, and often even training in a
special science, makes a philosopher qualified to contribute to the debate about scientific norms.
de Regt (2019, p. 333) distinguishes two kinds of norms in a theory of understanding:
- Prescriptive norms, which provide rules that scientists should follow if they want to achieve
scientific understanding of phenomena.
- Evaluative norms, which can be used to assess whether or not a particular scientific result
does in fact provide genuine understanding.
As de Regt discusses in the paper, his theory of understanding provides evaluative norms without
posing “universal restrictions on theories or theory choice, but it does entail that certain theories
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are preferable over others in certain local context." (de Regt, 2019, pp. 341–2). The contextual
theory of understanding can, therefore, be used to analyze in which way a certain physical theory
yields understanding, but it doesn’t say whether this kind of understanding can or ought to be im-
proved on. Basically, it suffices, especially in the effectiveness theory, when physicists successfully
apply their theory, even only to build computers and smartphones, that they have (genuine) under-
standing. But being able to build complex technology or making successful empirical predictions
or even to build new theories (the three ways a theory is said to be reliably successful, according
to de Regt and Gijsbers) can be possible without knowing the scientific descriptions of the rele-
vant objects. Therefore, one needs prescriptive norms, like the demand for these descriptions, to
do physics, otherwise understanding is rendered by whatever scientists do successfully. And how
many scientists are needed to qualify a scientific theory to be intelligible or effective? If there are
two competitive theories in the same domain, it seems that de Regt’s theory cannot distinguish
either theory to provide more or less understanding than the other, as long as there is a group (?) of
scientists successfully using the theory. The prescriptive norms that I intend to establish for physi-
cal theories are not arbitrary. They are, first, motivated by the principal epistemic requirements of
understanding and the the basic questions we can pose in our scientific inquiry, and secondly by
their historical success and usefulness in different physical theories.
5 Thermodynamics and Statistical Mechanics
In my critique of Grimm’s and de Regt’s theories of understanding, I pointed out that physicists
have disagreed on what counts as a satisfactory level of understanding. Some, like Newton or
Einstein, were critical of certain received views and pushed for a deeper kind of understanding.
In doing so, both noticed that the physics of their time did provide understanding-why but not a
sufficient level of understanding-what or understanding-how. Newton’s own theory could explain
the falling apples and the motion of planets, but it was incapable of answering what gravity is. Al-
though in the Principia Newton doesn’t feign any hypotheses to a scientific description of gravity,
he seemed to be dissatisfied with this state of physics as he wrote in his famous letter to Bentley in
1693:
That gravity should be innate, inherent, and essential to matter, so that one body may
act upon another at a distance through a vacuum, without the mediation of anything
else, by and through which their action and force may be conveyed from one to another,
is to me so great an absurdity that I believe no man who has in philosophical matters a
competent faculty of thinking can ever fall into it. (quoted in Janiak, 2008, p. 54)
Newton himself was not able to deliver the ontological underpinning for gravity. Nevertheless, he
agreed (with many of his Cartesian critics) that his theory of gravity was incomplete because it did
not provide understanding-what nor understanding-how of gravitational phenomena.
Similarly, Einstein noticed shortcomings in understanding electromagnetic and quantum me-
chanical phenomena. What is the nature of the electromagnetic field in giving rise to this asymme-
try in explaining an electric current? This question lead Einstein to build special relativity, which
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delivered new scientific descriptions for space, time, light, and the electromagnetic field in general.
In this way, special relativity gave us new ways of understanding how nature works, and Einstein
later did the same for gravity in his general theory of relativity.
Taking what-questions seriously and demanding understanding-how, instead of mere understanding-
why, Einstein also opened the door for revolutionary developments in quantum mechanics. The
title of the EPR-paper shows this concern (Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen, 1935): Can Quantum-
Mechanical Description of Physical Reality Be Considered Complete? They concluded that, given
locality, quantum mechanics does not provide a complete description of reality. Even if quan-
tum mechanics were complete in the sense of EPR, the wave-function itself remains a mysterious
object that cannot directly describe objects in three-dimensional space, since it is mathematically
defined in configurations space. This prompted John Bell (2004) to introduce local beables in
order to mechanistically explain quantum phenomena that provide genuine understanding-how. I
don’t want to lose myself in the depths of quantum physics, as the significance of mechanisms and
understanding-how for this theory is still heavily disputed (although I think the strongest arguments
are indeed in favor of them). Instead, I want to rewind time a hundred years to discuss in detail my
tri-partite distinction of understanding in thermodynamics and statistical mechanics. A lot can be
learned and applied from this period to quantum physics and other (future) physical theories.
5.1 Understanding in the Historical Development
The modern form of thermodynamics was developed in the early and mid-1800s, although signif-
icant work has been done before already from the beginning of the 17th century, when physicists
and engineers began to build steam engines. The major goal was to make these engines efficient,
and studies in thermodynamics helped in extracting more work from heat. The basic properties of
a thermodynamic system are quantities, like volume, pressure, temperature, and entropy.14 These
quantities are purely phenomenological, that is, they are measurable properties of macroscopic
systems. The theory then gives three laws how thermodynamic systems behave. For all practical
purposes, thermodynamics is all that is needed in order to build, use, and manipulate steam engines
and explain thermodynamic behavior in general.
The standard history of thermodynamics and statistical mechanics goes something like this.
Physicists of the 19th century didn’t believe in atoms; thermodynamics was developed without
reference to an underlying ontology; and Boltzmann was the lonely knight to defend the atomic
theory against an army of positivists lead by Mach. The first two parts are incorrect, and Boltz-
mann’s fight against the rest mostly took place when Mach returned from Prague to Vienna in
1895—as we will see, another controversial part of Boltzmann’s theory, besides atoms, was his use
of probabilistic reasoning in physics.
Before the advent of modern thermodynamics, the caloric theory was the standard theory to
account for the behavior of heat (Fox, 1971). The most important justification for the caloric
theory was provided by Joseph Black (1728–1799) in 1757, when he discovered latent heat, that
is, when adding heat to a system won’t increase temperature, which occurs in phase transitions
14The concept of entropy found its way into thermodynamics only in 1854 in a paper by Rudolf Clausius (1822–1888),
but it took another decade for Clausius to come up with the name “entropy” (Purrington, 1997, p. 95).
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(Purrington, 1997, p. 75). Black wasn’t particularly interested in the scientific description of heat
(’What is heat?’), so it was Laplace and Lavoisier who advocated and developed the caloric theory
and who explained latent heat by the behavior of this novel caloric fluid (Chang, 2013, p. 478).
The basic idea is that the caloric fluid binds with the particles. In a phase transition, the changes in
this binding changes the phase without changing the temperature. Although Benjamin Thompson
(later count Rumford) experimentally showed in 1798 that the caloric theory was untenable, by
extracting a limitless amount of heat when boring cannons for the Bavarian monarchy, the caloric
theory was still the predominant theory of heat until the 1820s.
One important step toward the modern formulation of thermodynamics was taken in Sadi Car-
not’s little book Reflections on the Motive Power of Heat (1824), in which Carnot (1796–1832) gave
the first formulation of the second law of thermodynamics (Purrington, 1997, p. 86): “Wherever
there exists a difference of temperature, wherever it has been possible for the equilibrium of the
caloric to be re-established, it is possible to have also the production of impelling power” (Carnot,
1897, p. 48). Carnot was guided throughout his book by the caloric theory, which made it possible
for him to imagine the flow of the caloric fluid in different physical set-ups. For example, in, what
was later called, the Carnot cycle, Carnot “made an explicit analogy to water engines, which went
along nicely with his notion that caloric produced mechanical work in the course of ‘falling’ from
a place of higher temperature to a place of lower temperature” (Chang, 2013, pp. 497–8). Even
when it turned out that heat is not a special kind of fluid, this scientific description of heat made
it possible for Carnot to make progress in thermodynamics and to find a new law. So apart from
providing understanding-how, a scientific description can be used, even if it is wrong, to guide the
intuition of a scientist to develop new physics.15
After the death of Laplace in 1827, the caloric theory lost one of its most famous supporters;
since then the atomic theory of matter gained more and more followers. Building on the results of
Carnot and Joule, Clausius in 1850 gave a mathematical formulation of the first and second law
of thermodynamics that is familiar to us today. This formulation of thermodynamics is only in
terms of macroscopic phenomenological quantities, like temperature, volume, heat, and entropy.
Although atoms are not part of Clausius’ formulation of the laws of thermodynamics, Purrington
remarks that a scientific description of matter in terms of atoms had been crucial to this develop-
ment:
Neither Joule, Clausius, and Maxwell nor those who preceded them (namely, Wa-
terston, Herapath, and König) could have developed their ideas without a thorough
commitment to atoms or to molecules as collections of atoms. (Purrington, 1997, p.
129)
In his other works, Clausius set out to explain properties of the specific heat of gases in terms
of the motion of atoms, in particular, it was of great interest to explain the value of the quotient
of the specific heat at constant pressure cp and at constant volume cv for air (and for other simple
15This was also one of the main motivations for David Bohm to develop his own quantum theory, which he himself
preferred to call the ontological interpretation, although it was empirically equivalent to standard quantum mechanics
(see van Strien, 2020, for a detailed discussion).
19
gases). The number cpcv = 1.421 for air couldn’t be explained by macroscopic properties. The
first to explain this value with the atomic theory was August Krönig (1822–1879) in 1856 aiming
at understanding-how of this quotient. He postulated only translational degrees of freedom for
the motion of atoms, and calculated the theoretical value to be 1.67. This was too much off the
mark. So Clausius introduced further internal degrees of freedom of atoms, and these additional
postulates about the mechanism behind specific heat cleared the way for Maxwell and Boltzmann
to calculate the quotient of the specific heats, which yields 1.40 (see de Regt, 2017, section 6.2, for
further historic and mathematical details).
As early as 1738, Daniel Bernoulli (1700–1782) used the atomic theory of matter in order to
explain the pressure of a gas. In a similar spirit John Herapath (1790–1868) did so in 1820 and John
James Waterston (1811–1883) in 1845 (Darrigol and Renn, 2013, p. 767). Their work, however,
was not widely recognized, and only with the publications of Rudolf Clausius, probably because of
his reputation as professor at the ETH Zurich, the atomic theory gained more traction in the physics
community. In 1857, Clausius made the first step toward a mathematically precise atomic theory
of gases by introducing the statistical concept of the mean free path, which describes the average
distance that atoms move before colliding. Building on Clausius work, James Clark Maxwell
(1831–1879) used statistical arguments to derive for the first time in 1860 the velocity distribution
of gas molecules in equilibrium, which now bears his name (Darrigol and Renn, 2013, pp. 769–
70): v2 exp (− v2
T 2
), with T the temperature of the gas. This was the time when the atomic theory
of matter started to show its power to statistically explain the behavior of gases and to go beyond
the laws of thermodynamics.
Ludwig Boltzmann, the most famous advocate of the kinetic theory of gas, built on Maxwell’s
work. In his papers of 1868 and 1871, he generalized the Maxwell distribution to atoms that have
internal degrees of freedom and that could be affected by external forces, such that the distribu-
tion became exp (− EkT ), with E the sum of the kinetic and potential energy and k the Boltzmann
constant. He also proved that this generalized equilibrium distribution , which has been named
the Maxwell–Boltzmann distribution, is stationary. In his landmark paper of 1872, Boltzmann
accomplished several tasks at once. First, he derived (or rather conceptually justified) the Boltz-
mann equation, which describes how an arbitrary velocity distribution of atoms changes in time
and ultimately approaches the Maxwell–Boltzmann distribution. Thus, the Maxwell–Boltzmann
distribution is the unique distribution for a gas in a box. In a next step, Boltzmann derived and
interpreted the H-theorem (Boltzmann himself named it more appropriately the minimum theo-
rem). The H-theorem is the molecular analogue of Clausius’ second law of thermodynamics, and
Boltzmann thereby completed the reduction of thermodynamics to the atomic theory of matter.
After criticism from Maxwell (in guise of his demon) and Loschmidt’s reversibility objection,
Boltzmann agreed that the H-theorem and therefore the second law of thermodynamics allows for
exceptions, that is, not all systems in non-equilibrium will reach equilibrium, only most will do, as
he noted in 1877:
One cannot prove that for every possible initial positions and velocities of the spheres,
their distribution must become more uniform after a very long time; one can only
prove that the number of initial states leading to a uniform state is infinitely larger than
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that of initial states leading to a non-uniform state after a given long time; in the latter
case the distribution would again become uniform after an even longer time. (quoted
in Darrigol and Renn, 2013, p. 775)
In this period, although the kinetic theory could explain a lot, the adversaries against it began to
rise due to the increasing popularity of positivism, especially in France, Germany, and Austria. By
the end of the 19th century, Boltzmann was indeed basically alone defending the reality of atoms
and the kinetic theory of gases. For many of his allies and sympathizers had died: James Clerk
Maxwell († 1879), Rudolf Clausius († 1888), Josef Stefan († 1893), and Johann Josef Loschmidt
(† 1895). In 1895 after 28 years in Prague, Boltzmann’s greatest rival and the main developer of
positivism, Ernst Mach, returned to the University of Vienna, where Boltzmann started to teach in
1894. In contrast to Mach, who had young and accomplished followers, like Friedrich Wilhelm
Ostwald (1853–1932) and Max Planck (1858–1947), Boltzmann was not able to convince any
rising star in the new generation.16
To my mind, a major reason why positivism in physics had gained popularity at the end of the
19th century was that the macroscopic formulation of thermodynamics had been completed before
the kinetic theory could deliver understanding-what and understanding-how of thermodynamical
phenomena—this very situation plays a crucial role in the reception of quantum mechanics, too
(Cushing, 1994). There was at the beginning no agreement between the developers of the kinetic
theory on what the precise scope of the theory was. Maxwell’s demon and Loschmidt’s reversibility
objection showed that Boltzmann’s initial understanding of the reduction of the second law of
thermodynamics needed some polishing.
This was the environment in which Mach could attract the young generation and some of the
experienced physicists, like Gustav Kirchhoff (1824–1887) and Hermann von Helmholtz (1821–
1894) (see also Holton, 1992), with phrases to be found at the end of his Conservation of Energy
(1872) and elsewhere:17
The object of natural science is the connexion of phenomena, but theories are like dry
leaves which fall away when they have ceased to be the lungs of the tree of science.
(quoted in Blackmore, 1972, p. 85)
If we are astonished at the discovery that heat is motion, we are astonished at some-
thing which has never been discovered. (quoted in Blackmore, 1972, p. 86)
Mach’s doctrine was to abolish all non-observable entities from physical theories. Everything that
cannot be directly confirmed by experiments was discredited as a mere form of fiction. Physics
16Max Planck later changed his mind when he used Boltzmann’s idea of quantizing energy for his work on blackbody
radiation. Albert Einstein, although studying Boltzmann’s work, was still too young a student at the ETH Zürich at
this time.
17Although often the same people worked also in electromagnetism, positivism didn’t seem to be so prevalent in this
theory. A rival theory to the field theory of electromagnetism was Wilhelm Weber’s action-at-a-distance theory. It
would be worthwhile to find out how this theory was influenced by positivism (see, for instance, Hon and Goldstein,
2016).
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can and should only provide understanding-why; understanding-what and understanding-how are
wishful thinking as they are based on unverifiable metaphysical claims. He saw in thermodynamics
a theory that had fulfilled his ideas, and he ruthlessly dismissed anyone who tried to complete a
macroscopic description by microscopic mechanisms.
Ironically, because of Boltzmann’s success in explaining the laws of thermodynamics the fol-
lowers of Mach, especially Ostwald, tried to develop a scientific description for thermodynamic
systems. Instead of particles, for they cannot be directly observed, Ostwald chose energy as a kind
of fluid as the underlying substance. Energy was said to be measurable and therefore preferable to
particles (Cercignani, 1998, Sec. 11.4). History showed where the research project of energetics
has lead, but they did finally concede due to the success of Maxwell’s and Boltzmann’s work that
it was worthwhile to investigate what matter is made of. The energetists in fact disagreed on what
energy is (Deltete, 2012). For Ostwald, energy was indeed a substance of which matter was built,
and he thereby conceded that some form of understanding-how is possible for some form of pos-
itivism. In contrast, the mathematical physicists Georg Helm (1851–1923) developed a version of
energetics, in which energy is rather an abstract principle that unifies all physical phenomena. This
doctrine was in this respect closer to Mach’s philosophy than Ostwald’s.
Finally, Ostwald admitted in the 1909 preface of his textbook Grundriss der allgemeinen Chemie
to had been on the wrong track:
I am convinced that we have recently come into possession of experimental proof of
the discrete or grainy nature of matter, for which the atomic hypothesis had vainly
sought for centuries, even millennia. (quoted in Cercignani, 1998, p. 209)
Max Planck at first opposed the kinetic theory, too, because it made the “universal” laws of
thermodynamics only valid in most cases; Planck couldn’t accept that physical laws may allow for
exceptions. In 1882, he wrote that “the second law of the mechanical theory of heat is incompatible
with the assumption of finite atoms [. . . ] a variety of present signs seems to me to indicate that
atomic theory, despite its great success, will ultimately have to be abandoned” (quoted in Lindley,
2001, p. 115). Having seen first-hand the great success of the atomic theory in his own work,
Planck became one of the harshest critics of positivism. In 1904, he wrote
Though I am persuaded of the fact that Mach’s system, pushed to all its logical
consequences, does not contain any internal contradiction, I am no less convinced of
the fact that this system has, after all, but a purely formal meaning: it is incapable
of penetrating the very essence of science, and this because it is extraneous to the
essential feature of any scientific research, i.e. the construction of a picture of the world
which is rigorously stable, independent of the differences which mark the generations
and peoples. (quoted in Cercignani, 1998, p. 210)
So at the beginning of the 20th, two of the harshest and most accomplished followers of Mach’s
positivism—both Planck and Ostwald received the Nobel Prize—reversed their earlier convictions
and agreed to the reality of atoms, the merits of statistical mechanics, and that physics can indeed
lead to a deeper form of understanding than previously believed by positivists.
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This historic excursion shows that physicists pursued different kinds of understanding of ther-
modynamics. Until the mid 19th century, thermodynamics was always associated with a particu-
lar scientific description of matter. In the earliest beginnings in the 17th century, physicists were
searching for an atomic theory of gases due to Newton’s influence. For a short period at the end
of the 18th century the phlogiston theory became popular until it was superseded by the caloric
theory of Laplace and Lavoisier. After the fall of the caloric theory in the 1820s, the atomic theory
and positivism filled the vacuum and battled for victory. Thanks to the ingenuity and perseverance
of Ludwig Boltzmann and James Clerk Maxwell and others, thermodynamics did not remain in
this positivistic state. They postulated that thermodynamic systems were composed of particles
(understanding-what), whose motion guided by Newton’s laws of motion determines the behavior
of steam engines and gases (understanding-how).
Mach, on the other hand, was not interested in scientific descriptions and hence in understanding-
what. It was not even possible or scientific for him to ask what-questions in the first place. He aimed
at understanding-why that only refers to the phenomenological level. The energetists, although
Machian in spirit, were divided. Ostwald postulated energy as a substance (understanding-what),
and one can argue that in doing so he indeed aimed at a mechanical explanation in Glennan’s
sense (and therefore at understanding-how).18 Helm rather interpreted energy as a fundamental
relational principle of nature and as a unifying principle for the laws of nature. Energy should
explain the relations and changes between thermodynamic variables and ultimately between all
physical variables. So it seems that energy played more of a nomological or dynamical role in
Helm’s philosophy as the cornerstone of understanding-why of physical phenomena. Like Mach,
Helm refrained from providing further scientific descriptions of matter beyond what can be directly
observed.
Both the energetists and the positivists had to concede the advantages of applying statistical
mechanics to thermodynamics (and black-body radiation). They were ultimately swayed by the
empirical success of statistical mechanics. But which kind of empirical success? I think they
would not have supported statistical mechanics and the atomic theory if these were only able to re-
cover the exact predictions of thermodynamics—something that has been explicitly made against
the de Broglie–Bohm theory, too (Becker, 2018)—, and then the discussion would have focused
rather on theoretical and philosophical differences between the two approaches (as it indeed hap-
pened in the early days of Maxwell’s and Boltzmann’s works on thermodynamics). As Planck
did, they even criticized certain new but unobservable predictions of statistical mechanics. It was
only after a series of new predictions and applications of statistical mechanics (including Planck’s
works on black-body radiation and Einstein’s works on Brownian motion) that statistical mechan-
ics became widely accepted. I think that Maxwell’s and Boltzmann’s motivation for developing
statistical mechanics did not only lie in making new predictions, but also in their metaphysical or
epistemological requirement to discover what matter is ultimately made of.
18I thank an anonymous reviewer for raising this idea.
23
5.2 Entropy: Clausius and Boltzmann
After this historical case study, I want to illustrate my tri-partite distinction of understanding with
a conceptual example, namely, two ways of defining entropy in thermodynamics and statistical
mechanics according to Clausius and Boltzmann.19 Changes in entropy are crucial in many ther-
modynamic processes and the different ways of defining entropy provide a different kind of under-
standing these very processes. One may argue that both the Clausius and the Boltzmann entropy
provide us with understanding-how of thermodynamical processes, but I will show that the Clau-
sius entropy does this to a much less satisfying degree and leaves important what-questions open,
whose answers would give us a more fine-grained understanding-how by specifying a detailed
mechanism.
5.2.1 Clausius Entropy
From the very beginning, thermodynamics has been a phenomenological theory, whose primary
domain was to elucidate the relationship between heat and work, more precisely, under which
conditions heat can be transformed into work (Lemons, 2009, 2019; Myrvold, 2020). In order to
quantify this conversion, Rudolf Clausius defined entropy (Cardwell, 1971, pp. 260–276):
But as I hold it to be better to borrow terms for important magnitudes from the ancient
languages, so that they may be adopted unchanged in all modern languages, I propose
to call the magnitude S the entropy of the body, from the Greek word τρoπη, transfor-
mation. I have intentionally formed the word entropy so as to be as similar as possible
to the word energy; for the two magnitudes to be denoted by these words are so nearly
allied in their physical meanings, that a certain similarity in designation appears to be
desirable. (Clausius, 1867, p. 357)
Although Clausius’s mathematical definition of entropy hinges on details of the Carnot cycle and
Thomson’s definition of absolute temperature (Thomson, 1853; Smith, 1976), the general idea is
that entropy is a conserved quantity in a reversible20 cyclic21 thermodynamic process. Consider, for
example, the flow of heat Q between two heat reservoirs at temperature TC and TH , respectively,
with TC < TH (Lemons, 2019, Ch. 10). What is the entropy change of the entire system, after
the heat Q flowed from the hotter to the colder reservoir? This is, indeed, an irreversible process
because there is no way to directly reverse the flow of heat in the other direction. Nevertheless, we
can replace this irreversible process by a reversible one:
19There are other definitions of entropy: the Gibbs entropy in statistical mechanics, the von Neumann entropy for quan-
tum systems, and the Shannon entropy for information. Robertson (2021) shows how the Gibbs entropy relates to
thermodynamics; Myrvold (2020) discusses how the von Neumann entropy relates to thermodynamics; and Carcassi
et al. (2021) do so for the Shannon entropy.
20It suffices for our purposes to characterize reversible processes as minimally (that is, quasi-statically) changing the
physical system so that they can be conducted in the reverse order (for a detailed discussion, see Norton, 2016b).
21A thermodynamic process is called cyclic, if it returns to its initial state (Norton, 2016b, p. 48).
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i) We separate the two reservoirs and use a box of gas with a moving piston to extract the heat
Q from the hot body at TH . The gas will thereby expand and push the piston until it reaches
the temperature TH .
ii) We then separate the box of gas and let the gas adiabatically22 expand until its temperature
drops to TC .
iii) We bring the box of gas in thermal contact with the colder reservoir at TC and push the piston
until the heat Q gets transferred into the reservoir.
In this reversible process, the heat Q got first transferred out of the reservoir at temperature TH
and then transferred into the other reservoir at temperature TC . According to Clausius’s definition
of entropy, the hotter reservoir lost QTH of entropy and the colder one gained
Q
TC
, such that the net










Although reversible, the entropy does not remain constant in this process, because the gas in the
box does not return to its initial state—the piston will not reach the same level as at the beginning.




The integral sums up all the incremental changes in entropy over any cyclical process. If the process
is reversible, equality holds; if the process is irreversible, the net result is negative, which means
that the final state has higher entropy than the initial state—given the proper sign convention as
we can see in the above example of a reversible (non-cyclic) process. This inequality is Clausius’s
formulation of the 2nd Law of Thermodynamics (Robertson, 2021, section 3 and 4).
This law describes how entropy changes in a thermodynamics process. It does not explain,
however, why a thermodynamic system that is forced out of equilibrium will seek spontaneously
by itself a new state of equilibrium.23 For example, the 2nd Law of Thermodynamics does not
say why heat spontaneously flows from a hot to a cold body or why the gas in a box expands
once in thermal contact with a heat reservoir. This spontaneous behavior is presupposed in all
thermodynamic processes. Since it is so fundamental, Brown and Uffink (2001, p. 528) called it the
Minus-First Law of Thermodynamics (see also, Myrvold, 2019): An isolated system in an arbitrary
initial state within a finite fixed volume will spontaneously attain a unique state of equilibrium.
We can ask two questions about the heat flow from a hotter to a colder body:
1. Why does a system in non-equilibrium finally attain a state of equilibrium?
22An adiabatic process is a process in which the physical system is closed, that is, it does not exchange heat or matter
with an outside system. The word adiabatic comes from the Greek word adiábatos, which literally means impassable
(from a “not” + diabatós “to be crossed”).
23Thermodynamic equilibrium is defined to be a state in which the macroscopic variables of a system, like pressure,
volume, temperature, and entropy, do not change over (sufficiently long) time (Robertson, 2021, section 3.1).
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2. How does this system change its entropy between two equilibrium states?
The first question is answered by the minus-first law: the system just does it by itself. No further
explanation is given for how the system does it. This is a pure case of understanding-why without
any further relation to the micro-constituents of the system.
The second question is answered by the 2nd Law (in conjunction with the -1st). Thermodynamics
postulates that the system has a certain temperature and that heat flows either directly between the
hotter and the colder body or (factually or hypothetically) between the heat reservoirs and the box
of gas. Hence, thermodynamics arguably provides us with a certain degree of understanding-how,
as it postulates temperature and the flow of heat. Especially, the flow of heat may remind us
of some mechanism that does explain how temperature or pressure changes. Heat as described
in thermodynamics, however, is not a mechanism in Glennan’s sense because thermodynamics
is silent about what composes heat. Heat exists as something that is not directly observable but
indirectly measureable and is exchanged in certain processes, but there is no scientific description of
heat. In contrast to the first question, the second question does give us some form of understanding-
how—some “proto-understanding-how”—, and yet it is obvious that more can and should be said
more about the nature of heat—which is in fact accomplished by statistical mechanics. So with
regard to understanding, we learn two things from thermodynamics:
A. Thermodynamic quantities, like heat, temperature, and entropy, are macroscopic phenomeno-
logical quantities. They are defined to be measurable quantities without a scientific descrip-
tion of what they actually are in terms of the micro-constituents of a physical system. There-
fore, thermodynamic quantities can be construed as functional because they are defined by
what they do rather than by what they are (Robertson, 2021, section 2).
B. Thermodynamic behavior is explained by the change of these macroscopic variables. In
particular, the change from non-equilibrium to equilibrium is explained by a fundamental
law, the Minus-First Law, that postulates this very phenomenon. Therefore, this law only
provides understanding-why for thermodynamic processes (without understanding-what or
understanding-how), whereas the 2nd Law provides some incomplete understanding-how, as
heat, if interpreted as some form of stuff, is postulated to exist and exchanged in certain
processes.
Statistical mechanics will complete thermodynamics and render genuine understanding-how for
why and how thermodynamic systems behave. A crucial ingredient is Boltzmann’s definition of
entropy.
5.2.2 Boltzmann Entropy
In his reduction of thermodynamics to statistical mechanics, Boltzmann answered the two ques-
tions that have been left open in thermodynamics (Darrigol, 2018, for a comprehensive analysis of
Boltzmann’s papers):
1. What is entropy (and all the other thermodynamic quantities)?
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2. How do thermodynamic systems approach a (unique) state of equilibrium?
By answering the first question, Boltzmann had the tools to answer the second. As we said in sec-
tion 5.1, Boltzmann postulated and justified the existence of atoms such that every thermodynamic
system consists of N particles, where N is of the order of Avogadro’s constant, that is, approx-
imately 1023. Since a particle is completely described by its position x and momentum p, we
can summarize the complete physical state of N particles as (x1,p1,x2,p2, . . . ,xN ,pN ), which
is called a microstate. All these points taken together comprise phase space, which has roughly
6 × 1023 dimensions. In order to get macrostates, one needs to partition phase space P (see Fig-
ure 4). A macrostate of a microstate arises from a map M that assigns to every microstate X a
macrostate M(X) corresponding to one of the subsets PM ⊆ P according to the partition: M(X)
is the macrostate of X if X ∈ PM .
Figure 4: Clusters in phase space according to thermodynamic macrostates and the appropriate
measure, as depicted by Roger Penrose (1989, p. 402). Thermal equilibrium is by far the
largest macrostate.
The tool that ultimately leads to explain the approach to equilibrium is Boltzmann’s definition
of entropy assigned to every point in phase space:
SB(X) := kB ln|PM(X)|, (1)
where kB is Boltzmann’s constant and ln is the natural logarithm.24 The main part of Boltzmann’s
entropy is |PM(X)|, which deserves some elaboration. In order to measure the sizes of the subsets
PM(X), one needs to introduce a measure λ, which assigns a number to every such subset. Con-
ventionally, if the system is finite, one normalizes the measure to 1 such that the size of the entire
24This definition of entropy is written on Boltzmann’s tomb, although Boltzmann actually defined entropy in a different
mathematical way, even if similar in spirit. This formula for entropy was due to Max Planck (Darrigol and Renn,
2013, p. 783) and taken up as the foundation for the neo-Boltzmannian project of statistical mechanics (Callender,
1999; Goldstein, 2001; Lebowitz, 1993a,b, 1994, 2008; Penrose, 1989).
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phase space would be 1. In the entropy formula, |PM(X)| denotes the size of PM(X) according




. The measure λ is conventionally
interpreted as a probability measure.25 Since for real physical systems, like heat flowing from a
hot to a cold body or gases in a box, the phase space volume of thermal equilibrium has by far the
largest volume according to the probability measure, it has the highest probability for a system to
be in or to approach it.
What is entropy then, and how does Boltzmann’s idea improve on Clausius’s? Notice that, unlike
thermodynamics, statistical mechanics starts with a scientific description of physical systems on the
fundamental level: all thermodynamic systems are composed of particles and all thermodynamic
quantities supervene on the configuration, the properties, and behavior of these particles. In this
way, statistical mechanics gives us a complete understanding of what thermodynamic systems are
composed of (understanding-what). Entropy is a measure of the number of microstates (that is,
of states of the underlying mechanism) that give rise to the same macrostate (that is, the same
macroscopic quantities). In particular, the mysterious quantity heat and also temperature in the
Clausius entropy are described in terms of particles: heat flows when particles are exchanged or
interact, and temperature is a form of average kinetic and potential energies of particles.
How do thermodynamic systems approach a (unique) state of equilibrium according to statis-
tical mechanics? If we put two heat reservoirs into thermal contact, the entire system is in non-
equilibrium. Because the equilibrium state has such a large phase space volume, the probability
that the system will reach this state (rather quickly) is close to 1. In other words, if we zoom
into the phase space region of this low entropy macrostate, almost all microstates will move to a
macrostate with higher entropy and ultimately to equilibrium. It is physically possible that a low
entropy macrostate goes into another low entropy macrostate, but very few microstates within this
macro-region do that. According to Boltzmann’s reduction of thermodynamics to statistical me-
chanics, it is physically possible that heat spontaneously flows from a colder to a hotter body, but
the probability is so low that we won’t actually observe such behavior. In this way, Boltzmann pro-
vided a statistical-mechanical explanation, and therefore a statistical way of understanding-how, of
thermodynamic processes and the laws of thermodynamics, in particular the -1st (minus-first) and
the 2nd Law of Thermodynamics.
Statistical mechanics specifies a concrete mechanism for thermodynamic systems, namely, par-
ticles in motion that interact through classical forces and follow Newton’s laws—Boltzmann’s sta-
tistical reasoning supervenes on this mechanism. Therefore, thermodynamic processes can also be
causal-mechanically explained: given the microstate of a thermodynamic system, Newton’s laws
of motion determine the future behavior of the system. This is another way of understanding-how
of thermodynamic processes.26 Statistical mechanics gives us a deeper understanding for the same
25There is a debate on whether one should rather interpret the measure as a typicality measure, but this should not
concern us here (see, e.g., Volchan, 2007; Frigg, 2009; Werndl, 2013; Lazarovici and Reichert, 2015; Myrvold,
2019; Maudlin, 2020; Hubert, 2021).
26One may think that because of the imaginary ensembles Gibbsian statistical mechanics (which is the most popular
formulation among physicists) does not specify a mechanism—I thank an anonymous reviewer for raising this con-
cern. First, Robertson (2021) argues that ensembles are not essential for Gibbsian statistical mechanics; they are
rather introduced to interpret the probabilities as hypothetical frequencies. Second, Gibbs introduces a probability
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processes that are explained by thermodynamics (apart from explaining new phenomena, like mix-
ing). Statistical mechanics is, therefore, a good example of how to transform a theory that renders
only understanding-why or an incomplete form of understanding-how into a theory providing us
with genuine understanding-what and understanding-how.
6 Conclusion
I argued that scientific inquiry, and therefore our quest for understanding nature, does not only
start by asking why but also by asking what. Answers to what-questions are scientific descriptions,
which are valuable by themselves because they fulfill a basic epistemic need. With the help of sci-
entific descriptions I introduced three kinds of understanding: understanding-what, understanding-
why, and understanding-how. Current theories of understanding, especially the theories by Grimm
and de Regt, have focused on understanding-why. I argued that understanding-how is a deeper
kind of understanding than merely understanding-why, because it requires, in addition, to under-
stand what something is made of and how these constituents generate or produce the phenomenon.
Understanding-how is provided by mechanistic explanations.
One may object that what-questions are primarily metaphysical questions and therefore not the
domain of physicists. But what-questions are common place, especially in chemistry and biology,
and also in physics (Chakravartty, 2017). I side with Felline (2019) that what a physical system is
made of is primarily a scientific question and not merely metaphysics (although metaphysics can
fill in some important details and add to a more comprehensive picture of the world ); the overall
postulation is a scientific endeavor, that ought to be provided with a physical theory.
We also saw in the discussion of thermodynamics that a theory of understanding touches on the
realism-antirealism debate.27 I think that there is some overlap between these areas (which would
be also interesting to explore further), but they start from two different questions. Whereas the re-
alist or anti-realist asks,“What does a theory tell us about the world and what is the right attitude of
scientists toward scientific theories?” a theory of understanding asks, “What are criteria to under-
stand the world and what can we expect to understand in the first place?” The realism-antirealism
debate focuses more on the metaphysical consequences and the postulation of unobservable enti-
ties within scientific theories. The understanding debate, on the other hand, focuses more on the
epistemic and pragmatic sides of scientific inquiry and shows different ways scientists try to under-
stand the world. I think that understanding starts from a more general point of view and focuses on
epistemic criteria, wishes, and demands for what we can aim to know about the world in the first
place. Grimm, for example, begins his investigation into the nature of understanding from this high
measure over sets of microstates, which specify the probability in which particular microstate the system is. In this
sense, Gibbs presupposes a mechanism or, at least, the existence of microstates. It seems, however, that a Newto-
nian mechanism does not play such a prominent role for Gibbs as it does for Boltzmann, whose entire project is to
derive statistical mechanics from Newtonian physics. Since Gibbs follows a more pragmatic approach than Boltz-
mann, Frigg and Werndl (2019) call Gibbsian statistical mechanics an effective theory and Boltzmannian statistical
mechanics a fundamental theory.
27I thank an anonymous reviewer for pushing me on this point.
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vantage point, and, as we saw, de Regt considers also other representational devices for scientific
inquiry apart from scientific theories.
Although both fields start with different questions, they do meet on certain issues and are con-
nected in important respects. When we distinguish different kinds or levels of understanding we
do quickly step into the waters of the realism-antirealism debate. Scientific descriptions and mech-
anisms deepen our understanding and fulfill an epistemic need to know what something is made of
and how it behaves, but, the anti-realist may ask, “Shall we believe in these entities? How certain
are we that the world matches these descriptions?” Roughly, understanding emphasizes more how
a scientist relates to a theory, whereas the realism-antirealism emphasizes more how a theory is
related to the world, how the theory properly represents the world, and on which grounds one can
and should believe in the theory. As de Regt and Gijsbers (2017) argue, and I agree with that, a
certain degree of understanding can be even accomplished when the theory is wrong, that is, when
the theory does incorrectly represent the world. This would be, of course, a no-go for a realist and
rather fuel the anti-realist’s skepticism that current or future theories do not match the unobservable
ontology of the world. The significance of the pessimistic meta-induction seems to be, therefore,
more important for the realism-antirealism debate than for theories of understanding.
One can also see the trends within the realism-antirealism debate in the theories of understand-
ing. Both Grimm’s and de Regt’s theories reflect the antirealist’s tendencies in past and current
physical theories, in particular the trends in quantum mechanics. Both agree that physics in the an-
tirealist or positivistic tradition provides understanding enough as long as the scientific community
regards these standards as sufficient. Both do not want to establish prescriptive norms that would
push scientists to improve their degree of understanding. My account, on the other hand, builds
on the realist’s attitude for developing standards of scientific understanding. My historic case stud-
ies showed that even in times where antirealism was the received framework of the majority of
physicists, some, like Einstein, Boltzmann, and Bell, did dissent from this norm and demanded a
deeper form of understanding. I, therefore, believe in an optimistic meta-induction: since these
demands for scientific descriptions and understanding-how were so successful, one should raise
them as general norms for understanding past, current, and future physics.
I hope that we can develop theories of scientific descriptions as has been done for scientific
explanations and that a closer focus on what-questions influence philosophical analysis of physics
(and science in general), as well as guide how physics is practiced and how physical theories can be
constructed—given the historical success of statistical mechanics, for example. I hope philosophers
and physicists come to better appreciate the importance of scientific descriptions. This may then
lead to a more fine-grained and more comprehensive hierarchy of understanding that considers
different kinds of descriptions, explanations, and theories, as well as pragmatic aspects of scientific
practice.
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